












Practicing Politics: technical project templates and political practice in a DFID country office 





For some time, development agencies like the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) have agreed that if aid is to be effective, it should be politically 
smart and locally-led aid. Yet both the critical and the reformist literature have argued 
that development agencies persist with technical, template-driven programming: 
political analysis has not been institutionalized. The study explores the blockages to 
institutionalization. 
Purpose The study aims to identify why development representations are persistently 
technical in their form, and what blockages exist for developing locally grounded and 
politically aware programmes.  
Approach and 
methods 
The study presents an ethnography of the process of developing the core elements of 
the governance portfolio in an (anonymised) DFID country office. Focusing on a key 
design workshop, the study is situated within a wider organizational ethnography. 
 Findings The persistently technical justifications for programmes are a result of the 
bureaucratic form itself, its accountability and approval processes. Political analyses 
represent countries in such a way that officials can prioritise selection from a 
repertoire of technical models. However, scepticism about the tractability of 
governance problems to such analyses and programming has led to an emerging 
understanding of politics that creates space with the bureaucratic form for politically 
aware practice.  
Policy 
implications 
That policy on politically aware programming should emphasise good operational 
practice over emphasis on explicit analysis; and should continue to emphasise 
technical models like the adaptive management models which create room for such 
practice. 
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For years there have been calls for development agencies to move away from the application of 
template-driven aid models and towards the adoption of contextualized and politically aware 
development programming. Carothers and de Gramont (2013, pp. 10–11) emphasise the importance of 
“politically smart aid” as a political method where analyses of political relations and power dynamics 
inform the design and implementation of programmes. Yet as Carothers and de Gramont go on to 
observe (2013) and Yanguas and Hulme have affirmed (2015), the adoption of political analysis that has 
been the main analytical tool to this end has never quite taken formal root. They suggest that the 
development sector’s project documents remain resolutely “technical” in nature: that is, they are based 
on template theories of change that do not take into account the political dynamics through which 
change might happen. More recent calls for political approaches betray a certain weariness: they ask 
why the self-evidently useful has not happened and have shifted their attention to the possible 
“barriers” to such analysis (Booth, 2011b; Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 2009; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Yet 
while various reasons have been proffered for the persistence of the technical in development project 
documents, they are typically not well substantiated by direct evidence of the practices or analysis of 
the potential blockages.  
This article addresses these practices. Based on an ‘aidnography’ of a Department of International 
Development (DFID) country office, it focuses on the composition of the core narrative of the office’s 
governance portfolio and in particular on a two-day workshop. The article argues that the persistently 
technical nature of development project documents derives from the working of the bureaucratic form 
itself. DFID is a decentralised and classically Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy. Approval and 
professional accountability processes justify projects based on established, replicable rules and 
precedents. These are semi-codified into a repertoire of governance project blueprints, templates or 
’travelling models’, to use the term from Behrends, Park, and Rottenburg (2014). The debates analysed 
in this study show how, in order to justify aid spending, officials select from the repertoire of models 
according to the particularities of the case. Following Tania Murray Li (Murray Li, 2007, p. 7), selecting 
the models is a matter of representing the country and problematising its governance in such a way that 
solutions are apparent (Ferguson, 1994 [1990]). This form of political analysis casts the country’s power 
relations as a certain kind of object, which allows officials to justify certain governance models. 
Observing the bureaucratic limits to the adoption of political analysis, this article considers an 
alternative framing of politics as a practice. Reframed thus, politically informed development entails a 













fundamentally different view of the nature of the country, its politics and how change happens (cf. 
Eyben, 2010 for a similar argument). This standpoint is sceptical about the tractability of political 
behaviours to existing programming models and to the political-economic approaches that act as their 
corollary. It presumes these behaviours cannot be identified through a priori political analysis, but 
require iterative engagement through political practices of relationship building. In the office, they are 
anchored in recently developed technical ‘adaptive management’ models.2 
The article closes by addressing policy considerations. It suggests that the emphasis on institutionalizing 
political analysis is unlikely to fulfil the ambitions for aid to become more locally grounded. Political 
analyses represent the developing country with certain problems and deficiencies in such a way as to 
justify certain forms of intervention and to identify where they should be prioritised. Standardisation is 
crucial to bureaucracies which demand recognised, evidence-based interventions that provide 
intelligible accounts within the hierarchy and scrutiny mechanisms (Wynne, 1988: 156). It is the 
bureaucratic form itself that causes the persistently technical nature of the documents and the 
circumscribed influence of political analyses. Representations of the political economy of a country will 
inevitably be interpreted and framed to legitimise certain generic technical models, for all the 
specificities of the local context they may include. Given the ways of working implied by the 
bureaucratic form and its emphasis on replicable and reliable models, a productive approach to pursuing 
locally led may be to refocus attention on the practice rather than the representation of politics: that is, 
on the practices of building and negotiating relationships and networks. The article shows how this idea 
of practice existed within the design discussions raised. The growing interest in models that create space 
for iterative and unplanned political practice offers a powerful way to unpick the dilemma.  
The article lays out this argument as follows: after this introduction, the second part reviews the 
literature on ‘rendering technical’ development contexts and discusses the nature of the ethnographic 
material on which the argument is based. The third part elaborates the argument presented by the 
                                                          
2 These new technical models are based on short iterated processes of design, experimentation and adaptation 
(encapsulated in Andrews, 2013 at least one copy of which was physically present in the conference room). A 
growing epistemic community has increasing formed around certain initiatives, including “Doing Development 
Differently”, http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/the-ddd-manifesto/ and “Thinking and Working Politically” 
http://www.dlprog.org/research/thinking-and-working-politically-community-of-practice.php. While they share 
many features of other approaches (to pick some: Chambers, Pacey, & Thrupp, 1989; Earl, Carden, Patton, & 
Smutylo, 2001; Eyben, 2006a; Honadle & Rosengard, 1983; Horton & Mackay, 2003; Korten, 1980). 













article, particularly with reference to the literature calling for and identifying barriers to political analysis 
in development. The fourth part presents brief policy-oriented conclusions. 
Technical Aid and Politics: Instrumental and Critical Perspectives 
For some time, writers with reformist goals have been calling for political economy analyses to influence 
programming decisions (notable examples include DFID, 2005; Hyden, 2008; Leftwich, 2007; Unsworth, 
2009). This kind of ‘politically smart aid’ urges both contextualization and explicit recognition of power 
through analyses of the political and institutional dynamics underpinning the behaviours of a 
governance system (for overviews, see e.g. Booth, 2011a; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Fisher & 
Marquette, 2014; Hout, 2012; Hudson & Leftwich, 2014). These are founded on ex ante analytical tools 
are still to be embedded in the institutional fabric of key donor organizations (Carothers & de Gramont, 
2013; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Such has been the gap between rhetoric and institutional action that 
reform-minded observers have turned to the ‘obstacles’ or ‘barriers’ to research uptake and to the use 
of political economy analyses in the day to day of development work (Booth, 2011b, pp. 6–12; Duncan & 
Williams, 2012; Hudson & Marquette, 2015, pp. 70–72; Unsworth, 2009; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015, pp. 
212–215). Blame has variously been laid at different aspects of the political economy of the donors 
themselves (Hout, 2012, pp. 406): their management processes and incentives (Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 
2015), their incentives to spend funds, and their lack of flexibility (Booth & Unsworth, 2014: v–vi; 
Carothers & de Gramont, 2013, pp. 184–192; Hout, 2012, p. 408). These aspects form part of the 
institutional audit and management culture of the bureaucracy. The literature identifies a further set of 
limitations established by the mental models of officials, rooted in officials’ pre-configured conceptions 
of the functioning of their developing country counterpart-governments and limited by expectations 
that governance improvements would reproduce their own norms and institutions (IDS, 2010, p. 69; 
Unsworth, 2009, p. 889). 
The critical literature tells a similar story, albeit from a different standpoint. For this literature, the 
depoliticization of the context is crucial to the development enterprise itself: that is, development 
representations identify a specific problem and propose a solution, usually based on pre-established 
models, with suitable legitimising evidence and track record (see e.g. Apthorpe, 1986, pp. 379–380; 
Escobar, 1995, pp. 41–43; Ferguson, 1994 [1990],p. 69; Murray Li, 2007, pp. 7–10; Porter, 1995, pp. 70–
71). The identification of problems is intrinsically linked to the validation of particular solutions. These 
take the form of “travelling models”, whose validity is supported as far as possible by evidence, lay 
down certain protocols for action which will be applied in different contexts (Behrends et al., 2014, p. 1). 













For post-development writers such as Escobar, the process of ‘rendering technical’ is part of a covert 
geopolitical covert strategy adopted by the elites of the World Bank and the US development apparatus 
in particular to mask the exercise of power through ‘Development’ (Escobar, 1995, pp. 30–39, 107–109; 
see also Goldman, 2005; Mitchell, 2002, pp. 242–243).  
Others, however, reject the assumption that covert geopolitical goals characterise all aid spending. They 
seek to escape the relentless “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Yarrow, 2011, p. 6) that characterised the 
earlier “post-development” movement.  Tania Murray Li argues that the rush to identify hidden motives 
for development serves to obscure rather than elucidate (Murray Li, 2007, p. 9): for her the will to 
improve is genuinely meant, its intentions “benevolent, even utopian” (ibid, p. 5), even if the effects are 
not. She argues that translating the political context into a technical approach – ‘rendering technical’ 
(Murray Li, 2011, p. 60) – is necessary for agencies to legitimize their interventions. The ethnographic 
turn this argument typifies grounds the analysis of development in an analysis of practice (see for 
example the contributions to Lewis & Mosse, 2006b; Mosse, 2011d; Yarrow & Venkatesan, 2012), 
drawing extensively on insights from Science and Technology Studies.3 Increasingly, documents (Hull, 
2012) and policies (Shore, Wright, & Però, 2011) are being taken seriously not so much as texts but as 
ethnographic objects and as mediators of meaning, susceptible of different interpretations and 
embedded in practice. With bureaucracies, there is always a ‘huge contradiction between the neat and 
tidy public image, and the messier reality’ (Wynne, 1988, p. 150). A project necessarily stands for 
multiple possible meanings and interpretations – to use Bruno Latour’s term, an ‘actant’ (cited Latour, 
1996; Shore & Wright, 2011, p. 3). That shift from policy to implementation is intrinsic to the operation 
of expertise. To explore this, the growing ‘aidnography’ tradition often takes a particular project and 
“studies through” from the project document to the implementation (Wedel, 2004; Wright & Reinhold, 
2011).   
Yet there are considerable practical challenges in this form of research. Bureaucrats will often ’refuse to 
be objectified’ in the terms necessary for an ethnography (Mosse, 2011a, p. 20). Neither the critical 
literature nor the reformist literature draws on direct evidence of practice to resolve these diverging 
explanations. Such analyses that exist are typically of professionals reflecting on their experiences as 
participants within the development sphere, ‘hovering on the threshold’ (Eyben, 2009). In particular, 
there remains a gap in the analysis in the practices by which the document is produced (although there 
                                                          
3 Notably the work of Bruno Latour in understanding the knowledge practices of experts and professionals (Latour, 
1987, 1996), cited in e.g. Mosse (2005), Lewis and Mosse (2006b).  












are rare examples to the contrary, see e.g. Goldman, 2005 for a polemic; Green, 2011; Mosse, 2005, pp. 
21-46). The lack of back-stage access to such practices has forced authors to deconstruct documents 
rather than analyse how they documents were composed. The consequence is that the works revealing 
the disjunctures that exist between the documented intention and the realities of development practice 
(Lewis & Mosse, 2006a; Mosse, 2005; Murray Li, 2007; Quarles van Ufford, 1988; Rossi, 2004; 
Rottenburg, 2009) are often asymmetrical, since they cannot explore the practices of producing the 
documents in detail. For example, Tania Murray Li’s fine-grained analysis of an Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) project in Indonesia ends at the project documents (Murray Li, 2007), as do other ethnographic 
analyses (e.g. Ferguson, 1994 [1990]; Mitchell, 2002).4 Why has the will to improve consistently retained 
its exclusively technical character? Indeed in Murray Li’s case the ADB actively ignored the careful 
research that they had conducted into the local area and politics, preferring a technical solution (Murray 
Li, 2007, pp. 125–126). They funded this work; the knowledge might have been useful, consonant with a 
genuine ‘will to improve’. The twin practices of problematising and proposing solutions could have but 
did not take into account the knowledge they had generated into the context. Why would the political 
analysis not be used, if the will to improve is genuine? What are the blockages? 
The article provides a response to these questions. The analysis draws on two months of fieldwork in an 
anonymised DFID office, collected as a doctoral researcher and as an observer. It focuses on a particular 
workshop which formed the starting point for the design of the governance portfolio. As such, it offered 
an unusual opportunity to analyse the composition of the justifications underpinning a range of 
programmes within the governance portfolio. The country in question was characterised by weak 
governance arrangements, predatory elites and an ongoing history of conflict. These were the early 
conceptual shoots underpinning the work of composition and justification for a full package of projects, 
and marked some of the rawest discussions as different theories and narratives of change were tested. 
It supplements observation of the workshop with extended discussions and interviews with the officials 
involved in the workshop and in surrounding discussions. Eschewing the option of ‘studying a 
programme through’, it instead focuses on the limited arena of negotiation of the core elements of the 
governance portfolio.  
The case has been selected specifically to reveal the role of politics within these practices of 
composition: a two-day workshop within a DFID country office, whose purpose was specifically to 
                                                          
4 Indeed, for all the methodological critique of the post-development movement, Escobar’s own emphasis on the 
categories working at the heart of a bureaucracy (Escobar, 1995:, pp. 106–113, p. 143 et seq.) 













formulate the portfolio of projects for the Governance Team.5 Political arguments will be revealed here 
if anywhere: as Yanguas and Hulme (2015) observe, it is within the governance cadre6 above all others 
that political analyses are prioritized and DFID is one of the ’most likely cases’ for donor adoption of 
political analysis. Governance itself as a domain of interventions is concerned centrally with the proper 
functioning of the state and its relations to society, matters crucially concerned with politics. Crucially, in 
this particular case, the DFID governance officials and leadership of the office were strong and 
personally committed proponents of the importance of thinking and working politically. The discussions 
here were framed and driven by members of the governance profession, and therefore started from a 
broadly shared set of incentives and understanding of change. As I shall show, within that framing, there 
were a number of different incentives and priorities that had to be balanced: the appetite for risk and 
the extent to which politically oriented work was appropriate, over more traditional forms of technical 
assistance. At the same time, I show how the portfolio had to address countervailing bureaucratic 
norms, calling for reliable, familiar and predictable modalities, less risky or politically contingent 
reforms, or ones which are more measurable and reproducible. These I suggest are a matter of the 
bureaucratic form, which prefers replicable technical expertise rather than the specificities of context 
and which seeks reproducible and recognisable travelling models. 
Methodologically, the work presented both opportunities and challenges. As a researcher I was engaged 
by the participants who presented their own theorizations of what was happening, second-guessed my 
analyses, and gave their own accounts of the events. The analysis here is therefore replete with what 
Holmes and Marcus describe as para-ethnographic material (Holmes & Marcus, 2005). In this, the 
participants’ reflections on their working practices are also supplemented by my own past experience as 
a political economy consultant, on occasion for DFID country offices. However, the fact of access shifted 
considerable pressure onto ‘exit’ from the field. Within bureaucracies, project documents are socially 
produced through careful negotiation. An aidnography, which second-guesses but is subject to none of 
this negotiation, is necessarily ‘anti-social’ (Mosse, 2006). It undercuts the negotiation by which a 
document has been produced. Yet the authority of anthropological studies traditionally rests on the 
possibility of creating distance between the researcher and the immersion of their field experience. For 
expert ethnography, exit from the field can therefore be deeply problematic. The reactions of research 
                                                          
5 It is based on written notes taken during the two day session, and written up immediately thereafter as well as notes 
of other discussions with the governance team. 
6 Within DFID, the governance cadre was composed of professional specialists in this kind of programming – that 
is, matters of “how a country manages its affairs, including how power and resources are acquired, managed and 
distributed” (DFID, 2016). 













participants cannot easily be removed from the writing process (Eyben, 2009, pp. 77–79; Mosse, 2006; 
2011b, p. 51). I agreed with participants on a third party review of any disputes about the possible harm 
of any material be placed in the public domain, including this paper, while I retained full control of the 
material. This review would entail a second authoritative reading on the ethical balance, while I retained 
academic control of the material.7 No review was necessary in this case. 
Composing a Governance Portfolio 
The workshop which forms the focus of this study was planned by the Head of Governance, Paul (all 
names have been anonymised). Paul had been in his post for six months, and the workshop was an 
important early step in the design process for the Governance portfolio, a key aspect of his role. The 
workshop was intended to define the core concepts underpinning the package of projects that would 
form the portfolio, and the basic justification for these decisions. These would then be worked up by the 
Governance advisers into ‘business cases’ (the documents justifying projects), articulating a full 
justification for the funds. It transpired that Paul had gone into the workshop with a fairly clear idea of 
what he wanted from the portfolio: his goal was to get office buy-in and to develop an overarching 
narrative for the package of projects he had already envisaged. In particular, he had to get support from 
the Head of Office, George, and from the Service Provision team, led by Sam, whose health and 
education work his own governance team might be expected to support. To this end, he had earmarked 
two days, requested several colleagues to facilitate discussions or present, and had invited in two 
experienced and respected DFID Governance Advisers (Dan and Martin) from outside the office to help 
keep the discussions on track.  
In the following analysis of the event, it is broken into three broad stages: first, the process of taking 
stock of the repertoire of governance interventions and project models which could be drawn upon; 
second, the application of the repertoire through the process of selection from within these models; and 
third, the composition of an overarching portfolio narrative from within that selection. These were 
interlinked and proceeded broadly sequentially, although I have taken some liberty in harmonizing the 
order, at the risk of making the transitions seem too smooth (in fact, discussion tracked back and 
forward, particularly between taking stock and making the selection).  
                                                          
7 David Mosse resolved significant conflict around his draft through a mediation process, throughout which he 
retained control of the material and of the argument (discussed by the mediator and author in, respectively, Eyben, 
2009; Mosse, 2006). 













Taking Stock: Travelling Models and the Governance Repertoire 
The workshop opened at 9.00am on a Wednesday morning. The tables in the big conference room had 
been folded away and set aside, and the chairs had been pulled into a giant horseshoe. People had 
filtered down and were taking their seats. Despite a warning from Camille (a governance adviser and 
confidante of Paul) which was intended to manage my expectations, I felt and shared a buzz of 
anticipation within the room. It was an opportunity for officials to spend time engaging an intellectual 
problem outside of the day-to-day of operational project work, the meetings and the emails and the 
drafting or responding to documents.  
To get the discussion going, Paul had scheduled the morning and early afternoon with a series of 
presentations for discussion. An opening presentation from the Head of Office sketched the boundaries 
of the problems, institutional partners and possible solutions. He exhorted officials to think broadly and 
flexibly about how projects could bring together different ingredients, moving beyond traditional 
governance project models focus on capacity-support to government agencies or civil-society. Paul had 
set up a short, sharp series of four presentations, each of which was to identify an example of working 
politically and flexibly. The first, presented by Martin, show-cased successful examples of flexible 
projects from DFID’s global governance programming, based on an iterative practice-oriented 
development (e.g. Andrews, 2013; Booth & Chambers, 2014; Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Wild, Booth, 
Cummings, Foresti, & Wales, 2015); the second presented a flexible, multi-level and multi-pronged 
project targeting a range of specific obstacles to economic growth, from the private sector development 
team; the third, discussed not a type of project but ways to act politically (this ‘odd one out’ I return to 
this below); and the last which identified ways of bridging accountability and empowerment 
programming. Paul had, in addition, already circulated four briefing papers which identified different 
kinds of break-down in the relations between state and society and in possible “pathways” by which 
these problems may be solved.8 Two of these he presented in more detail, both forming the core of 
models he hoped to incorporate as part of the portfolio.  
The morning’s presentations suggested a two-fold approach to politically informal programming. The 
first was how political relations were analysed and described. Although many of the presentations and 
subsequent discussions emphasized the importance of politics, very few of the discussions referred to 
                                                          
8 They were variously titled: ‘Collective action by supporting coalitions’; ‘Promoting positive competition to 
strengthen delivery and accountability’; ‘Putting empowerment and accountability in the heart of the portfolio’; 
‘Unblocking reforms’. 













details of the political environment or context specifically. The briefing papers, for example, were 
supported by depictions of the state and its relations with society which explicitly addressed power but 
were abstracted from the context: each could be applicable to the governance portfolio in any country 
characterized by neo-patrimonial politics, predatory elites and weak state institutions.9 Power relations 
were described in explicit but generic categories. The second conception of politics was less explicit; it 
emerged most clearly in the ‘odd-one-out’ presentation. Felipe, a governance adviser, had been brought 
in to discuss under the title: ‘The need to engage politically: what does it really mean in [country]?’ He 
was considered to be a particularly strong example of political work within the office, since he spent 
considerable time out of the office and had close relations with his host government counterparts. Paul 
had selected him to give one of the few presentations because he personally valued this approach and 
knowledge of their hosts’ bureaucratic and political culture. Felipe talked about the importance of the 
relations to partners and the need for constant, daily engagement. He talked about the importance of 
personal connections and the need for close personal management, the presence and political 
awareness needed to manage a governance programme. In doing so, he asked ‘how many of you have 
gone out for a beer with your counterparts?’ Framed thus, ‘politics’ becomes not so much a matter of 
analysis but a matter of practice and of relations. It refocuses attention on building relationships and on 
the political act of mobilising meaning within a particular arena (see generally Eyben, 2006a, 2006b). 10  
As an object, a country’s political relations takes on dual aspects. Each crystallises different 
understandings of the nature of politics and how change happens. Each materialises in different aspects 
of officials’ work to – in the first place– justify and document proposed projects and – in the second – to 
manage these projects’ implementation. In the former justificatory work, political analysis legitimizes 
certain project models; but in the implementation of programmes, politics concerns a set of practices 
which are profoundly personal and relational. The discussion following Felipe’s presentation warmly and 
unanimously endorsed the value of his position and approach – my other experiences in the office 
confirmed that it was a crucial tenet in many of the officials’ approach to their work, albeit one that was 
not easy to achieve. The adaptive management project models already introduced by Dan were 
designed to make space for the second, practice-oriented way of understanding politics: they were 
designed specifically as a model which would create the space for more flexible operational work. Paul 
                                                          
9 These have been systematized and developed through various research programmes, e.g. the work of the Africa 
Power and Politics Programme, http://www.institutions-africa.org/ or the Crisis States Research Centre, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Home.aspx  
10 To use a term employed by Annemarie Mol, politics is done rather than known (Mol, 2002). There is not the 
space to develop the implications of the more radical aspects of this argument in this case. 













had spent considerable effort, indeed, the majority of these sessions, convincing the office that these 
models were viable: that is, this form of iterated and flexible projects had been successful in the past 
and were considered legitimate within the broader DFID hierarchy. Legitimacy within DFID was crucial 
for projects which must be approved by the Minister or senior leadership. Paul had established that the 
governance portfolio would have to include these project models: the challenge was to design and 
justify what form these would take, and how they would integrate with more traditional institutional-
support and capacity-building projects.  
Selecting from the Repertoire: Politics Deferred 
Embedded in the presentations of the morning, Paul had asked Sam (the Head of Service Provision, an 
expert facilitator and a key ally for Paul) to lead a session to get the creative cogs turning. In introducing 
the session, she invited the officials to formulate a design statement on a long strip of paper – a 
strapline summarizing the purpose of the governance portfolio. I was urged by Martin, one of the two 
external Governance Advisers, to contribute – ’who knows, yours might be the one that we choose’. 
After a moment’s thought, I duly wrote a statement out. The participants got up and started to order 
the strips, grouping them and discussing their merits, with the locally hired officials mostly retreating to 
the back of the group. The statements were ordered according to the level of ambition they showed; 
some talked about instruments and modes of change, others outcomes. I watched as my own was 
buried without mention in one of the groupings. It became clear, as the ordering process continued, that 
the specific political context was not discussed. Dan (the second of the two governance advisers from 
outside) asked ’but what is unique to this country?’ It was a question that I found expressed my own 
frustration at this lack of contextual detail. No answer was given. Most of the straplines were abstract, 
resting on abstract analytical categories about a predatory state, patrimonialism and weak institutions, 
and the discussion followed suit. As I reflected on the session afterwards, however, it struck me that the 
feeling of frustration that my strapline was ignored was at odds with the belief that my carefully framed 
contribution merited greater attention. It too was based on an abstract statement, one based on my 
own profound lack of knowledge of the context but a familiarity with political economy analyses and 
categories.  
In the end, the session did not turn up an elegant or convincing anchoring idea from which to develop 
the rest of the programme. This lack of a design statement was to characterize the discussion of the 
afternoon. Paul opened the discussion out for general discussion and across three or so hours, the 
remaining participants – around a dozen, although throughout the afternoon people kept dropping in 













and out – discussed what might be the statement which would tie the governance portfolio together. A 
succession of ways to generate social change were tested out and discarded: to raise a new generation 
through tertiary education or tap into the diaspora; to use aid conditionality or diplomacy to leverage 
change; to adopt the briefing paper’s theories of change oriented at overcoming the disconnect 
between state and society. All had antecedents in development thinking, were tested and reviewed, but 
none had sufficient traction to be retained.  
As the discussion continued, the room divided sharply between those who suggested that the 
programme needed to start by organising around the ‘how’ or the approach – the project model or 
‘solution’ to be adopted – and those who advocated for starting on the problem, with the model 
implied. Sam, Camille, and others suggested that the starting-point should be more classically one of 
problem or issue identification, and from that solutions would flow (the usual expert response faced 
with a lack of knowledge, cf. Rottenburg, 2009, p. 189). For Sam, organising the problems was the core. 
She drew a diagram, whose concentric rings offered the perfect pictorial representation of this process: 
a grounding strap-line to be entered in the centre, the problems in the next ring, approaches in the next 
and specific actions in the farthest out ring. Paul fell into the other camp. He advocated for a flexible 
approach that would explore how best to support processes of change, rooted in the approaches he had 
identified in the briefing papers and in practice, rather than analytical approaches. 
What was at stake between the two positions was precisely the nature of politics and the extent to 
which political analysis could be expected to provide the rubric by which projects were selected. The 
difference reflects the similar divide I identify in the role of political analysis above and in Felipe’s 
presentation; it is treats politics as a matter of practice rather than representation and analysis. Paul 
was worried about how little they knew about the context: ‘we just don’t know how change happens 
here … how the hell does change happen in this place?’ As Sam talked through her concentric rings, Paul 
jumped out of his chair and declared his dislike of the concentric rings, saying ‘I am nervous, it’s closing 
me in, it’s too pretty’. Yet while the lack of knowledge was a problem, it could not be solved by 
conventional knowledge-collection and analysis. At one point Dan queried the term ‘citizen’ and the 
framing of people’s relationship with the state as demand and supply: are they not also church-goers, 
family members, football supporters? Paul countered by asking whether it mattered whether they knew 
‘the anthropological details’ or precisely what they would do at this stage.  
The differences between Paul and Sam pertaining at once to the tractability of the political context and 
the relationships of which it is composed, the extent to which they are susceptible to analysis and 













theoretical abstraction. For Paul, the proposed careful progression was simply too structured: from the 
identification and ranking of problems centred round a core rubric, to the isolation of solutions of 
general approaches, to specific actions. Not only was the scope for useful analysis of the political 
dynamics limited, but the ability to articulate in advance a programme of action was also circumscribed.  
Two reasons exist for the inability to come to a decision. In the first place, no single external referent 
within the political context could be adduced to prefer one or the other programme or model. Political 
analysis of the context would be mobilised to justify certain templates and project models, which had 
traction within DFID and would be recognised as a suitable approach with adequate precedents: both 
depiction of politics and the categories were generic and technical in nature and limited the scope of 
discussions and the ways in which politics could validly be described. The nature of Ruritanian 
governance, captured in low governance indicator indices, meant that much of the governance 
repertoire could be justifiable. The participants had however been unable to produce a rubric sufficient 
to justify preferring one over another on the basis of their knowledge of the external context. Secondly, 
there was no agreement that more or better research would lead to a better solution. It emerged that 
there was no shared position within the office, but rather two distinct ones: in the first place, the 
traditional governance models prompted more or better structured analysis as the way forward; the 
other suggested political relations were not amenable to useful political analysis, and that iterative 
exploratory work was essential to facilitate change. Paul wanted to develop a portfolio which relied on 
the iterative and experiential approach to understanding and changing political behaviours, rather than 
on a detailed plan developed through prior analysis. The lack of a clear external referent within the 
context, combined with the lack of agreement on any given referent’s utility, was the source of the lack 
of progress. The conversation continued to circle without resolution, and as the day dragged past four 
o’clock and towards five, the room had become a disordered mess, and the participants were 
increasingly tired and frustrated.  
Selection and Composition 
Early the next morning, the core governance team congregated back in the conference room, seemingly 
refreshed and full of energy once again. They were surrounded by an array of A4 paper, spread on the 
floor, each expressing ideas captured during the previous days discussion. It transpired that Paul had 
decided to commit to the package of projects that he had in mind from the beginning, notably including 
the new models expressed in his briefing notes. He had revoked the office-wide nature of the discussion, 













rejected the notion of generating a problem tree, and instead decided to focus on drawing up the 
necessary representations – a diagram, specified programmes, and a narrative.  
His selection balanced four traditional projects which were ongoing or up for renewal (capacity-building 
and project supporting Public Financial Management and forthcoming elections; a military reform 
project; a project based on support to women’s groups) with two newer models, whose precise 
dynamics were to be decided but which would centre on ‘unblocking reform’ and on ‘building 
coalitions’. The seventh project comprised support to the governance of reforms in the health and 
education sector, at the interface between Sam and Paul’s portfolios. Viewed as a portfolio, these drew 
on the ‘semi-codified’ repertoire of possible projects comprising governance professional expertise – 
‘semi-codified’, because as the new models show, it was constantly changing with the shift in policy 
discussions. These proposed projects offered a balance between traditional models of governance 
reform and the newer ideas expressed in the briefing papers; between governance as an end in itself 
and governance as a means to support better service delivery; between state and society, or governance 
’demand’ and ‘supply’; between those with corporate results, and those hoping to achieve deeper 
behavioural change; between direct application of capacity-building support, and approaches that 
incorporated more complex understandings of behavioural change; those that identified specific 
governance problems, and those that worked with provision of services. The balance was composed in 
order to meet the bureaucratic interests and expectations of the centre and the policy state of the art 
within the governance cadre.  In short, the rubric for prioritisation and selection was to be found within 
the repertoire of governance models and the desire for a balanced distribution within that repertoire, 
rather than in the specifics of the context. It was to be found in the internal categories of professional 
expertise, rather than in the specificities of the external context. 
The challenge that morning was therefore compositional rather than selective: it was to capture these 
seven ideas into a communicable and convincing narrative for an overarching portfolio, in just three or 
four headings forming an aesthetically elegant typology – which is to say, a typology that seemed 
balanced. It had to be palatable within the office, to George and within the DFID hierarchy, as well as in 
internal logical coherence and with the linkages to the other projects, notably the service-delivery 
sectors. The ingredients were there, but the selection rationale had to be articulated. In the hours that 
followed, Paul, Camille, Dan and Martin batted back and forward ideas. Occasionally, one of them might 
drop out of the discussion – Paul, for example – might take a seat off to the side, and draw out some 













ideas. Then he would come back, take a fresh piece of paper on the flipchart, draw a breath, and pitch. 
The pitch would list four headings, such as: 
Facility to support sector work  
Coalitions work  
Underpinning work  
Core programmes  
It would then elaborate the merits of the definitions, the manner in which they interact, how they fitted 
with each other and with the other programmes, and so forth. Martin might therefore say, ’I don’t see 
the difference between one and three’, and a further round of clarification and discussion would unfold. 
It would then be challenged – ‘we can’t communicate it’ – and another proposal would be offered. As I 
watched, I struggled to prevent myself become intellectually involved myself, thinking about possible 
ways to resolve what they were trying to do.  
As the morning drew on, they arrived at a set of projects and an overarching narrative which could both 
arrange the group of projects Paul had in mind. A series of diagrams were proposed to capture 
pictorially the approach that was favoured. Paul drew a spiral outwards from a single point, indicating 
the process of developing in an environment since ‘we don’t know how change happens’; later, 
someone suggested that the spiral have gaps, as opportunity to reflect and explore options; others 
returned to the concentric rings. Over lunchtime, they were working furiously on laptops, pulling 
together the diagram and the narrative they had prepared. They presented this once more to the office 
directly after lunch, where they received – after some questions and probing – an initial approval from 
George and the remainder of the team.  
Analysis 
Rendering Technical: Internal and external justifications for technical models 
Paul’s goal in convening the workshop was to compose and gain office backing for the governance 
portfolio that he and his team would design and deliver over the following two years. In practice, this 
meant reviewing and selecting a set of projects from the repertoire of governance models and 
producing the narrative and diagrammatic representations which could justify that selection and the 
decisions of location and focus the decision entailed. The high-level characterisation of the political 
context was sufficient to legitimise the applicability of the models but was not sufficient to provide any 













concrete justification for one or the other model. Such were the governance failings in Ruritania that 
most of the models from the governance repertoire would have been justified. The problems identified 
– the support to sector service delivery, or the responses to public financial management weaknesses, 
for example – were clearly established by virtue of the poor placement of Ruritania in governance 
indices, its recognisable weak systems, predatory governance and history of conflict. Specific political 
details of the particular were unnecessary.  In the final narrative that the team arrived at, the 
justification concerned defining a balanced representation of projects across the categories within the 
governance repertoire. No further contextualization to the local political environment was made during 
the workshop which meant that prioritising technical models was very difficult. No strapline, grounded 
in the political environment, was identified which could form the foundation of a prioritisation.  
In classical Weberian theory, bureaucracies demand the exercise of legal-rationality and due process. In 
the case of DFID, this takes the form of established models grounded in the problems identified through 
political analysis. Writing in a technology-oriented bureaucracy, Wynne suggests that ‘demands for 
public justification of technologies creates pressure to standardize design and operating rules, so as to 
present a clear, intelligible account to third parties.’ (Wynne, 1988, p. 156) Technical models are 
examples of programmes with established legitimacy within DFID, of which officials could be relatively 
assured of approval from within the hierarchy – “travelling models” (Behrends et al., 2014) or 
“immutable mobiles” (Latour, 1987, p. 227).  The workshop was a matter of applying the established 
repertoire of governance models to these internal bureaucratic considerations – the need for replicable 
models with a track-record of success. Paul and his supporters sought to draw on the repertoire with 
respect to internal considerations arising from the available budget, legacy projects, the internal 
appetite for differing forms of project, corporate targets and understandings of change: it was the 
balance of models, new and old, service sector-linked and governance linked, focused on ‘demand’ and 
on ‘supply’ that drove the decisions. The ‘application’ is not therefore mechanistic in nature, but 
requires considerable craftsmanship in balancing replicable models to respond to abstract problems, 
rather than politically-grounded responses tailored to Ruritania’s unique power dynamics.  
The very persistence of the technical nature of project documents suggests that something beyond the 
individual office culture of DFID is causing this. I suggest that the persistence of the technical nature of 
development may be ascribed to the bureaucratic form itself – that is, it is a function of DFID’s need to 
present justifiable programmes that have precedents and are well-evidenced.  













It may perhaps be argued that this group of officials was characterized by a lack of political imagination 
and another group could problematise with greater creativity or arrive at more innovative solutions. Yet 
it is not the case that the officials were disinterested in the political context. To the contrary, the 
governance advisers and officials present stressed the importance of politics in their work throughout 
the discussions, and indeed throughout my time in the office. My observation was that the officials were 
sincerely committed to political engagement. As Murray Li observers, the will to improve is genuinely 
meant (Murray Li, 2007) – it was simply that the political engagement at the point of preparing the 
project documents was limited primarily to the mobilisation of high-level political characterisations of 
the context to justify certain models. If there was a lack of development imagination, it was a lack that I 
shared and it was rooted in the ways of thinking about governance are structured by the categories, the 
models and the forms of political analysis. 
The political analysis legitimises the application of project templates which have traction within the 
bureaucracy. The country is framed as a particular, familiar kind of object. The recruitment of political or 
contextual detail would typically not disturb the core logics of the project templates or models, or the 
categories of political relations on which they rest. Detailed knowledge of the politics might actively 
undermine the legitimacy of the models within the bureaucratic hierarchy by producing unwanted and 
complicating information. Indeed, political detail is not necessary. In the absence of any defining feature 
or arresting strapline which supports a particular selection and prioritization – as in this case – it is still 
possible to legitimize a governance portfolio with reference to an abstract depiction of the context and 
the aesthetics of internal balance within the repertoire. Ruritania’s problems were apparent and 
validated through the research available.  
Rendering Operational: Making Space for Political Practice 
The traditional view of political economy analyses is that the behaviours, relationships and interactions 
that make up ‘political life’ can be observed and understood in a useful manner, through political 
economic analysis (Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Yet throughout, Paul articulated his position that better 
representations of the political context had limited utility in  prioritising programmes or understanding 
the manner in which change happens or making most programme designed decisions. He rejected the 
possibility of developing a problem tree or other form of structured analysis, or to collect more data. 
Instead, political awareness was characterised as a set of practices: a way of interacting with and 
managing counterparts and partners which takes into account a sensitivity to environment and the 
relations with people – to give one telling framing, it involved getting out of the office, and having a beer 













with their counterparts. It involves the fabric of practices and compromises that characterize the 
application of any body of protocols or rules. It was characterised in Felipe’s presentation which 
concerned the way of forming relations with partners and counterparts.  
Undertaken thus, being ’politically smart’ was a matter of exploring through the practices of negotiating 
meaning and creating relationships with other project actors rather than through analysing and 
representing of their motivations. It lay in making operational the technical representations justifying 
the applicability of a particular technical model. Politics was therefore deferred, not abandoned; it 
concerned rendering operational the technical document, rather than making a technical document 
acknowledge politics. From one view, it is the familiar bureaucratic process of contextualizing to the 
local conditions during a projects’ implementation (see e.g. Latour, 1996; Lewis & Mosse, 2006a; Shore 
& Wright, 2011; Wynne, 1988). However, this process of contextualisation proceeds from certain 
principles, in particular the acceptance of the network of relations in a complex social environment (see 
e.g. Eyben, 2010: 383; 2006b). It concerns the very nature of political relations and behaviours and 
processes of change. It proceeds from different assumptions about their tractability to useful analysis, 
and in particular the position that these relationships and the potential for change cannot be 
comprehended through research and must instead be affected through iterative action and learning.  
Set out thus, the attraction of the “adaptive management” models (Andrews, 2013; Booth & Unsworth, 
2014) comes into focus (although see Yanguas & Bukenya, 2015). Much of Paul’s efforts in the 
presentations described as taking stock at the beginning of the workshop were targeted at establishing 
the legitimacy of these models within the office (models which specifically were designed to created 
space for this adaptation) and this ensuring their inclusion in the mix. The technical models which Paul 
advocates for and which are grounded in adaptive programming, precisely accommodate the movement 
between the justification of projects within the bureaucracy and the operational practice ‘in the field’ of 
building relationships and negotiating meaning within the intervention. The point is not to say that they 
will be effective in addressing governance programming (Yanguas & Bukenya, 2015), but to observe the 
nature of the fit they allow within the bureaucracy. Their design intentionally creates space for officials 
to work politically but in a model that can be accepted within the bureaucracy; while they are generally 
applicable, they are also designed to incorporate the movement between justification on a generic basis 
and local contextualization. They permit iterated rounds of development and exploration through 
practice, while reconciling the need for that space for flexibility and the practices of politics with the 
need for recognized and legitimate models. They offer a way in which politics and adaptability to 













context may overcome the limitations of the persistently technical character of development 
representations. As such, their adoption as policy by the governance cadre is shaped by their positioning 
within the bureaucracy, and their need to generate reproducible and recognisable models – in a manner 
reminiscent of David Mosse’s writing of social anthropologists in the World Bank (Mosse, 2011c). 
Conclusion 
DFID is a bureaucracy, and therefore favours the application of consistent rules and precedents – the 
technical models arranged within the repertoire of governance as a category of programming. Countries 
are represented in ways which legitimise the application of these problems and solutions. The foregoing 
analysis suggests that political economy analyses contribute to that process or are treated as irrelevant 
or marginal. Consequently, I suggest that the emphasis on the institutionalisation of political analysis as 
a precursor to design should not be seen as a key route for development agencies to become more 
politically aware and engaged (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Unsworth, 2009, 2015; Yanguas & 
Hulme, 2015) – its function is often to justify certain technical models. That is not to say that such 
analysis should be stopped, but to recognise that this kind of analysis will always be subject to the 
exigencies of the bureaucracy and to the limits of the available repertoire of established models. It will 
have a function in justifying particular models and directing plausible starting points for programming, 
but its natural limits should be acknowledged. However, the foregoing analysis also highlighted another 
route to politically aware programming. The participants themselves focussed on the importance of 
practice rather than through representations and analysis of the political environment. This approach 
focuses on the ongoing work of forging relationships with programme stakeholders and of negotiating 
the details and meaning of programme interventions within the arena of a specific programme (see e.g. 
Eyben, 2006b). It refocuses on the capabilities and the professional skills necessary to do this. In this 
perspective, the value of iterative and flexible programming is to create an arena with enough space to 
negotiate and build relationships.   
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